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his essay on Benjamin Strong, the ﬁrst governor of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (1914–1928), evolved from the author’s research on
the development of an American internationalist tradition during and
largely in consequence of the First World War. Viewing Strong’s activities in
the broader context of the world view and diplomatic preferences of the edu-
cated East Coast establishment, a foreign policy elite to which Strong belonged
and most of whose norms he accepted, greatly illuminates his broader moti-
vations and the interwar relationship between ﬁnance and overall international
diplomacy. Strong’s work for international stabilization also provides revealing
insight into the limits of American internationalism during the 1920s and the
degree to which, in both ﬁnance and diplomacy, the interwar years represented a
transitional period between the restricted pre-1914 American world role and the
far more sophisticated assumptions which would guide United States policies
in the aftermath of the Second World War.
Strong’s career as governor encompassed 15 years of rapid domestic and
international change. The outbreak of the First World War just a few weeks
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after he became governor in 1914 greatly enhanced the economic position
of the United States. American manufacturers, ﬁnanced by American bankers,
provided much of the materiel essential to the Allied war effort, causing a ﬂood
of gold into the United States and tipping the international balance of trade and
payments heavily in favor of the United States. When the war ended in 1918,
European nations’ ability to undertake postwar reconstruction depended upon
the extent to which they could tap into the accumulated American capital re-
serves. During the war the U.S. economy boomed but American prices soared.
Once ﬁghting ended in late 1918, a short but intense recession occurred in
1920–1921, the product of a combination of the cessation of wartime orders
and the Federal Reserve Board’s efforts to end inﬂation by raising interest
rates. After 1922, for most of the decade the American economy boomed,
enjoying both real growth and price stability and generating the surplus funds
necessary to enable Americans to invest heavily overseas. In the mid-1920s,
private American loans ﬁnanced both the return of most European countries
to the gold standard and a wide array of European government and business
enterprises. The American stock market slump of October 1929 marked the end
of this prosperity. It precipitated a range of interlocking domestic and interna-
tional economic difﬁculties whose constantly intensifying destructive synergy
led to the worldwide Great Depression, the impact of which persisted until the
late 1930s. The Federal Reserve System’s inability to cope with the crisis led
directly to the Banking Act of 1935, which greatly enhanced the powers of the
Washington-based central Federal Reserve Board while diminishing those of
the constituent regional Federal Reserve Banks.
1. THE CONTEXT OF STRONG’S IMPERIALISM
It is worth remembering that Strong was merely one individual in a group of
prominent interwar American ﬁgures who were committed to what they termed
“internationalist” policies and who often worked closely together to this end.
This foreign policy elite generally favored expanding their country’s interna-
tional diplomatic and economic role. Its members usually supported American
intervention against Germany in the First World War and U.S. participation
in an international organization to maintain peace and in efforts to facilitate
Europe’s postwar economic recovery. Many also endorsed international arms
limitation and some an American guarantee of France’s security against a po-
tential future German attack. There was a strong Anglophile element to their
thinking: Most believed that an Anglo-American alliance, formal or informal,
and Anglo-American diplomatic and economic cooperation would be funda-
mental to any acceptable postwar settlement.1
1 On this outlook, see Priscilla Roberts, “The First World War and the Emergence of Ameri-
can Atlanticism 1914–20,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 5:3 (November 1994), 569–619; idem, “The      
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Insights drawn from more traditional diplomatic history, as opposed to
economic history, can help to illuminate some of Strong’s policy choices, sug-
gesting that his ﬁnancial activities can only be fully understood when viewed
in the overall context of contemporaneous broad internationalist developments
within the United States. In particular, his profound sympathy for the Allies
during the First World War, his support for American assistance to the Allied
cause, and his belief that Anglo-American cooperation, economic and other-
wise, must provide the foundation of the postwar international order, were far
from unique. This outlook was shared not only by most in the New York ﬁ-
nancial community, the Morgan partners, for example, but also by the majority
of the American East Coast elite, such as Theodore Roosevelt, his secretary of
state, Elihu Root, Root’s protege Henry L. Stimson, and numerous others.
The Anglo-American emphasis of the First World War and the 1920s seems
to have derived, in large part, from the broadly Anglo-Saxonist views of the
late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century U.S. upper crust. Roosevelt and
the circle around him subscribed to Mahanist views that American security and
the Monroe Doctrine had always depended upon Britain’s goodwill and the
consequent tacit protection that the British ﬂeet afforded against the depreda-
tions of other European powers.2 The Anglo-Saxonist movement reached its
apogee in the years around the turn of the century. Throughout the nineteenth
century, especially from the 1880s onwards, historians and political theorists,
such as the British Edward August Freeman, John Mitchell Kemble, and John
Richard Green, and their American counterparts, James K. Hosmer, Herbert
Baxter Adams, John W. Burgess, and the even more inﬂuential Reverend
Josiah Strong, John Fiske, and Mahan himself, disseminated and popularized
the belief that the Anglo-Saxon race, in effect the British and Americans, was
uniquely capable of self-government and had evolved the best and most demo-
cratic institutions to date.3 In addition, many admired the British Empire as an
Anglo-American Theme: American Visions of an Atlantic Alliance, 1914–1933,” Diplomatic
History 21:3 (Summer 1997), 333–64.
2 See Alfred T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston:
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International Conditions (Boston: Little Brown, 1910), esp. 35–124, 155–85; idem, Lessons of
the War With Spain (Boston: Little Brown, 1899), 289–98; Robert Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan:
The Man and His Letters (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), 148–49, 225–26, 268–69, 522–
25; Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), 144–45; William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the
Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 87–91,
149, 158–59; Kenton J. Clymer, John Hay: The Gentleman in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1975), 125–29.
3 The origins of this tradition are covered in Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny:
The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1981). For its later development, see Stuart Anderson, Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism
and Anglo-American Relations, 1895–1904 (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,
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example of enlightened government.4 Prominent British statesmen, for their
part, were eager to welcome the United States into the imperialist club as a
fellow Anglo-Saxon power which would, they hoped, be an ally. Conscious of
their own isolation vis-` a-vis the new European powers, especially the increas-
ingly assertive Wilhelmine Germany, they hoped that the United States and
Britain might establish at least a de facto alliance.5
This viewpoint informed Strong’s own Manichaean interpretation of the
war as a global struggle between the forces of good and evil. It was reinforced
by Strong’s personal ties with Britain, and given added ideological underpinning
by the belief that Britain and the United States shared a common Anglo-Saxon
heritage, one incomparably superior to that of any other nation. On the out-
break of the First World War, every indication is that Strong’s sympathies were
automatically and unhesitatingly pro-Ally, and that he was determined to do
all in his power to assist the Allies. This sentiment was entirely typical of the
social circles in which he moved.6 It also had a major impact upon his conduct
of wartime and postwar Federal Reserve business, predisposing him to close
cooperation with Britain and to a world view to which intimate Anglo-American
collaboration was fundamental.
The prominence of international considerations in Strong’s policymaking
should also be perceived as part of the broad outlook of the New York ﬁnan-
cial community, and as one aspect of the development since the late nineteenth
century of a sense that the United States was a world power, which should
both behave and be treated as one. One important goal of the Federal Reserve
System’s founders, particularly those New York bankers who were among its
most prominent architects, was to provide the United States with a central
banking system which would enable their country to fulﬁll its potential as an
international ﬁnancial power. Throughout the First World War and the 1920s,
Urge in the 1890s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), 13–16, 29–33, 123–24, l38–
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4 See Roberts, “The First World War,” 592. See also Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-
Interest in America’s Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century
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Strong and other leading New York bankers perceived the System primarily in
this light, as part of America’s mechanisms for dealing with the outside world.
Although their numbers were relatively small, they were highly inﬂuential.
They included some of the brightest up-and-coming young men from the top
East Coast banks. Among them were Henry P. Davison of J. P. Morgan and
Company, the intellectual Paul M. Warburg of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, and
Frank A. Vanderlip of the National City Bank of New York, not to mention
Strong himself and his colleague Fred I. Kent of the Morgan-associated Bankers
Trust Company. In the early twentieth century all these institutions had sub-
stantial international interests and plans to enhance them. For the U.S. ﬁnance
system, which until late in the nineteenth century had looked to Europe to
provide capital, their activities represented a new departure.7
From this perspective, the creation and operation of the Federal Reserve
System were an integral part of the increasingly assertive U.S. policies which
characterized the early part of the century. The United States ﬂexed its military
muscles in the Venezuela crisis and the Spanish-American War, as it sent the
Great White Fleet around the world, acquired the Philippines, administered
the customs of several Latin American countries, participated in international
arbitration conferences, helped to settle the Russo-Japanese War, intervened
in Mexico, and ultimately developed the plans which would eventually result
in the League of Nations. In this sense, it seems highly signiﬁcant that as
a young man Strong was one of a coterie of youthful diplomats, journalists,
ﬁnanciers, and military men, whose shared belief that the United States must
assume a much greater world role than in the past brought them together in a
small, exclusive private club, often termed “the Family,” at 1718 H Street in
Washington, D.C.8
It can also be argued that, as with a number of other American international-
ists among his contemporaries, Strong’s passionate devotion to internationalism
and to European economic reconstruction fulﬁlled certain personal needs of his
own. He was a man who needed a purpose, even a mission, in life. Shortly
before his death, Strong wrote: “All of my experience of life (and sometimes
it grips me hard) convinces me that nowhere can one get better guides than
from the teachings of Christ and [Abraham] Lincoln....Maybe it’s this point
of view which gives me more joy when salaries are raised than when the
discount rate is.”9 Indeed, to some degree his internationalist activities served
as a near-religious faith for him. In the United States, Strong was perhaps the
7 See Lawrence Broz, The International Origins of the Federal Reserve System (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1997).
8 See A. J. Bacevich, “Family Matters: American Civilian and Military Elites in the Pro-
gressive Era,” Armed Forces and Society 8 (Spring 1982), 405–18.
9 Strong to Walter T. Stewart, July 6, 1928, File 1117.2, Benjamin Strong Papers, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, New York.        
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most dedicated advocate of Europe’s recovery, and it became a cause to which
he literally devoted his life. Perhaps for personal reasons, Strong virtually drove
himself to death in the service of the Federal Reserve System and European
reconstruction. After the suicide of his ﬁrst wife and his divorce from her
successor in 1916, by all appearances Strong’s only interest in life became
his work. Shortly after his second marriage ended, Strong suffered the ﬁrst of
a recurrent series of bouts of tuberculosis brought on by overwork, a malady
whose associated complications ultimately killed him. Even when conﬁned to a
Colorado or Arizona sanatorium, supposedly recuperating, he habitually wrote
lengthy letters to associates on every aspect of Federal Reserve policy. The
“determination” to ﬁnish the “job” of European reconstruction was perhaps the
only thing keeping him alive. In 1928 Strong recounted his doctor’s reaction
when he learned of his patient’s decision to retire as governor, a choice which
seems to have been precipitated by his relationship with a much younger opera
singer, whom he intended to marry:
His advice was to quit as soon as possible and do it with as little effort as
possible. But he was not satisﬁed with that advice until he knew my plans,
as he feared that after a few months, inactivity might be worse than the work
would be after a long rest. He feels I need an anchor and naturally thought
of an occupation. ...H efeels that for ﬁve years past and longer I have been
kept alive only by my determination to keep alive until a job was ﬁnished,
once I let go that idea I would crack.10
It was perhaps not entirely surprising that shortly afterwards Strong died, still
supposing that the task of European economic reconstruction had been success-
fully completed.
2. STRONG AS INTERNATIONALIST
Strong was unquestionably a major force in the post-World War I economic
reconstruction of Europe. During the 1920s, credits extended by the New York
Federal Reserve Bank to the Bank of England, the Banque de France, the
Reichsbank, and other central banks, underpinned the restoration of the gold
standard throughout most of Western Europe. This was an endeavor in which
Strong worked closely with the New York ﬁnancial community, especially
the preeminent investment bank, J. P. Morgan and Company. Once a country
had made the commitment to return to the gold standard and had undertaken
the preparatory ﬁscal work of balancing budgets, cutting expenditures, and,
in general, observing orthodox economic principles, the Morgan banking ﬁrm
generally handled the American portion of loans to European governments,
10 Strong to Stewart, July 26, 1928, ibid.; on Strong’s temperament, see also Lester V.
Chandler, Benjamin Strong: Central Banker (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1958),
1–2, 47–53.      
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facilities intended to ﬁnance stabilization and thereby, it was hoped, promote
economic recovery from the ravages of war. On occasion the New York Federal
Reserve Bank also furnished credits to central banks in countries undertaking
stabilization measures. These undertakings were by no means purely American
in character, though the war had so diminished the ability of Europe’s central
bankers to orchestrate such endeavors and of private bankers to ﬂoat the associ-
ated loans that the Europeans required American assistance to do so. The 1920s
return to the gold standard was choreographed by a concert of central bankers,
an enterprise in which Strong and the Morgan partners were closely associated
with the Bank of England, the Banque de France, the Reichsbank, and the cen-
tral banks of Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium, as well as with those
countries’ leading private bankers. Biographies of Montagu Norman have also
drawn attention to the close friendship that existed between him and Strong and
their joint commitment to restore the gold standard in Europe and so implement
a return to the international ﬁnancial normalcy of the prewar years.11 Norman
was very conscious that Britain’s loss of ﬁnancial stature because of the war
meant that, to accomplish postwar economic reconstruction, Europe “need[ed]
the active cooperation of our friends in the United States,” the Federal Reserve
and private bankers whose ﬁnancial participation and assistance was a sine qua
non for the success of all such schemes.12
During the First World War, disputes among New York bankers over the
impact which Federal Reserve policies might have upon the outcome of the
European war led to ﬁerce debates within the System. In the 1920s, by con-
trast, much of the New York ﬁnancial community essentially shared a common
outlook as to the desirability of accomplishing Europe’s ﬁnancial rehabilitation.
While those investment bankers with German ties found the Morgan ﬁrm and
its allies moved too slowly for their liking in providing loans to ﬁnance German
recovery, they differed over timing rather than over fundamentals.13 At least
11 On these endeavors, see Richard Hemmig Meyer, Bankers’ Diplomacy: Monetary Stabi-
lization in the Twenties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Stephen V. O. Clarke,
Central Bank Cooperation 1924–31 (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1967);
Chandler, Benjamin Strong, chs. 6–11; R. S. Sayer, The Bank of England, 1891–1944, 3 vols.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), Vol. 1, chs. 7, 8, 15; Sir Henry Clay, Lord
Norman (London: Macmillan, 1957), chs. 5, 6; Andrew Boyle, Montagu Norman (New York:
Weybright and Talley, 1967), chs. 7, 8; Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard
and the Great Depression 1919–1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), chs. 4–7.
12 Quotation from Norman to G. Vissering, November 16, 1921, File G3/177, Bank of Eng-
land Archives, London; see also, for example, Norman to W. H. Clegg, October 13, 25, December
17, 1921, ibid.; Norman to V. Moll, February 6, 1922, ibid.; Norman to Baron Havenstein, June
23, 1922, File G3/178, ibid.
13 See Roberts, “The American ‘Eastern Establishment’ and World War I: The Emergence
of a Foreign Policy Tradition” (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1981), 530–36. Initially the
National City Bank of New York, the largest United States commercial bank, was far less wedded
to European recovery and currency stabilization than the investment banks, declining to partic-
ipate in the Austrian stabilization loan of 1923 and querying the 1925 Federal Reserve line of      
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in part, Strong’s dominance of the Federal Reserve System during the 1920s
reﬂected the fact that the New York ﬁnancial constituency was ﬁrmly united
behind him, another indication of the manner in which, despite the attempts of
the System’s founders to prevent any one region attaining such inﬂuence, New
York was able to prevail on most important issues.
The roots of Strong’s policies during the 1920s can be traced back at least
to the First World War. Strong became governor of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York almost concurrently with the outbreak of war in Europe. Like
other New York bankers, Strong perceived the war as providing an opportunity
to expand America’s international ﬁnancial role, to allow New York to be-
come a center which could aspire to rival London’s preeminent position. One
ﬁeld of opportunity for the United States was the development of a market
in commercial paper, or bankers’ acceptances, previously a London monopoly.
The new Federal Reserve Act permitted the Federal Reserve Banks to buy, or
rediscount, such paper.14 A second was the potential for U.S. banks to play a far
greater role in international ﬁnance than ever before, ﬂoating loans which would
likewise once have been left to the London market. Strong eagerly promoted
the development of American acceptance ﬁnancing, welcoming the manner in
which the war facilitated the growth of a U.S. acceptance market.15
On several wartime trips to London, Strong developed far closer ties than
before with British bankers—including those in the Bank of England—and
explored the possibilities of obtaining for the United States a decidedly more
substantial share of international ﬁnancing. Even before the United States in-
tervened in the First World War, Strong perceived that after the war Europe
would desperately require capital for reconstruction, and that his country would
possess the only substantial reservoir thereof.16 Some American bankers,
credit which the Bank of England negotiated to support Britain’s return to gold. Later in the
decade, however, the National City overinvested in foreign loans, particularly German bonds,
and suffered severe losses in the subsequent European ﬁnancial crash. Ibid., 537–39; Silvano A.
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14 See James Livingston, Origins of the Federal Reserve System: Money, Class, and Corpo-
rate Capitalism, 1890–1913 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 202–03; Burton I. Kaufman,
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15 Strong to Paul M. Warburg, August 5, September 10, 1915, Box 12, Paul M. Warburg
Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT; Chandler, Benjamin Strong, 83–96; Priscilla
Roberts, “‘Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?’: The Federal Reserve System’s Founding Fathers and
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16 Strong to Fred I. Kent, July 10, 1915, U. S. Senate, 74 Cong., 2d Sess., Hearings Before the
Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, 40 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing      
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particularly the Morgan partners, consciously discountenanced predictions of
postwar American commercial and ﬁnancial predominance.17 Strong carefully
emphasized that his country’s ﬁnanciers hoped not to shoulder aside their British
counterparts, but to enter into a partnership with them. He told Norman: “I do
hope that you and other sensible and friendly people in London do not attach
too much importance to the vain-glorious boasting of the American press about
these ﬁnancial developments.”18 Even so, in a speech in March 1916, Strong—
though sweetening the pill by emphasizing his own complete support for the
Allied cause—told prominent London bankers:
[T]his war might entail tremendous sacriﬁces upon the English people, includ-
ing the bankers, and if it involved the surrender of some part of the world[’]s
banking to New York, at least we believed that it would be surrendered upon
fair terms, on fair competitions [sic], and that some of us felt that if this great
sacriﬁce had to be made, England, which had established the standard of
commercial honor and integrity throughout the world, would rather relinquish
this great trust into the hands of those who spoke their own language and who
believed in the same institutions, and had, I hoped, the same high ideals of
honor and integrity.19
While some British ﬁnanciers, including the ofﬁcials of the Bank of England,
Sir Felix Schuster of the Union of London and Smith’s Bank, the partners of
Morgan Grenfell and Company, J. P. Morgan and Company’s sister ﬁrm, and
Sir Charles Addis of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, were
prepared to welcome or at least—in return for access to U.S. funds—tolerate
American cooperation, others were less sanguine.20 Yet few British bankers
were likely to welcome wholeheartedly any diminution of their own country’s
ﬁnancial predominance. Not unsympathetically, Strong recounted that, when he
visited Britain in 1916, Sir Edward Holden, chairman of the London City and
Midland Bank, “made an address at the Manchester Chamber of Commerce in
which he referred to efforts of American bankers to undermine Lombard Street’s
Ofﬁce, 1934–36), 30:9527; Strong, diary, March 28, 1916, File 1000.2, Benjamin Strong Papers,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
17 See, for example, Thomas W. Lamont, address before Cosmopolitan Club, March 31,
1915, 29–30, File 144-20, Thomas W. Lamont Papers, Baker Library, Harvard Business School,
Boston, MA; Lamont, “Financial Illusions of the War,” 209–11, ibid.; Dwight W. Morrow, “Ad-
dress delivered at New York State Bankers Association Dinner,” January 7, 1916, “Speech to
Commercial Club,” November 9, 1916, Speeches File, Dwight W. Morrow Papers, Robert Frost
Library, Amherst College, Amherst, MA. Strong congratulated Morrow on the ﬁrst of these
speeches. See Strong to Morrow, January 16, 1916, File Bankers Association, New York State,
ibid.
18 Strong to Norman, March 22, 1917, File 1116.1, Strong Papers.
19 Strong, diary, March 10, 1916, reporting speech at London Clearing Banks dinner,
File 1000.2, ibid.; cf. Strong to Alexander Mackenzie, July 1, September 17, 1915, File
1112.5, ibid.; Strong to Sir Edward Holden, April 19, 1917, File 1112.3, ibid.
20 Strong, diary, March 6–8, 10, 13, 21, 22, 23, 1916, File 1000.2, ibid.       
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supremacy and he was so overcome by the mere thought that the old man broke
down and wept.”21 Strong’s policies towards Britain rather neatly exemplify the
Anglo-American relationship of “competitive cooperation,” which the historian
David Reynolds perceives as characterizing the immediate pre-World War II
period.22
Yet, even as Strong pursued an enhanced ﬁnancial position for his country,
he also implemented policies that might be perceived as assisting Britain and
the other Allies at the expense of the United States. It is hard to exaggerate
the depth of Strong’s commitment to the Allies. Like many others of the East
Coast upper-crust elite, those Anglophiles whom Henry F. May has termed
the “custodians of culture,” Strong perceived the First World War as a global
struggle between the forces of good and evil, Prussianism, Kaiserism, and
autocracy against democracy, freedom, civilization, and Christianity.23 Even
before American intervention, he identiﬁed himself almost completely with the
Allied cause. Publicly explaining the meaning of the war in 1917, Strong stated:
Four hundred years ago [sic] the Anglo-Saxon race received the ﬁrst great bill
of rights upon which their personal liberties are founded, when King John of
England signed the great Magna Charta at Runnymede. For two hundred and
ﬁfty years that race in England has been engaged in building up constitutional
government. It was the beginning, the foundation of our personal liberties;
the foundation of the liberties of the English-speaking peoples throughout the
world. It was bequeathed to us one hundred and ﬁfty years ago by Great
Britain, and for substantially four hundred years we English-speaking people,
and those from other countries whom we have adopted, have been developing
our institutions based upon that foundation of constitutional law. For forty
years, since the war between Prussia and France, a military autocracy in Ger-
many, ﬁlled with lust for power, has been building up a great military structure,
on an entirely different theory of personal or autocratic government, and now
they have come into conﬂict—so the question is, which is going to win?
That is the greatest problem the human race has ever faced—constitutional
government against personally organized military government, with the Kaiser
at its head.24
Strong’s support for the Allied cause was slightly less fervent than that of many
of his associates, for example the members of the Morgan ﬁrm. The Morgan
21 Strong to James Brown, September 4, 1916, Munitions Hearings, 31:9937.
22 See David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937–1941 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981).
23 See Henry F. May, The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our
Own Time, 1912–1917 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 363–37; Roberts, “The First
World War,” 575–56; idem, “The Anglo-American Theme,” 338–30.
24 See Strong, “The Sale of Liberty Bonds,” address to the Four-Minute Men, New
York City, October 1, 1917, in Strong, Interpretations of Federal Reserve Policy in the
Speeches and Writings of Benjamin Strong, ed. W. Randolph Burgess (New York: Harper &
Row, 1930), 41.      
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partners, to whom he had always been extremely close, and whom he would
probably have joined had they not persuaded him to take the Federal Reserve
position instead, ﬁnanced and handled most of the Allied war purchases in the
United States.25 Like the Morgan partners, well before American intervention
Strong was determined to do all he could to help the Allies. To this end, he
pushed for interpretations of the new Federal Reserve System’s regulations that
would assist the Allies in their increasingly desperate quest to obtain American
ﬁnancing for the war purchases which were vital to their ability to continue
ﬁghting the war. In doing so, Strong at least temporarily undercut the devel-
opment of a New York acceptance market. By permitting repeated extensions
of commercial credits against Allied war purchases, he effectively converted
these securities into medium-term unsecured loans to the Allied powers, which
absorbed most of the capital that would otherwise have been available to ﬁnance
genuine acceptances.26 Strong was also one of those bankers who supported
the extension of American loans and credits to the Allies. In addition, in 1916
he negotiated correspondent relationships for the New York Federal Reserve
Bank with the Bank of England and the Banque de France, one purpose of
which was to facilitate the Allies’ American fund-raising.27
Strong’s efforts to assist the Allies involved him in lengthy and ﬁercely
contested battles with another major ﬁgure in the Federal Reserve System, the
New York banker Paul M. Warburg. The intellectual Warburg was perhaps
Strong’s closest friend; the two men had been allies in the struggle to create
the Federal Reserve System, and Warburg was one of those who persuaded him
to accept the position of governor. The German-born Warburg himself became
a vice-governor of the Federal Reserve Board, and probably its strongest voice.
25 On the Morgan ﬁrm’s wartime role, see “Memorandum Relative to Financing by J. P. Mor-
gan & Co. during the World War,” no date, File 213-7, Lamont Papers; Kathleen Burk, Britain,
America, and the Sinews of War, 1914–1918 (Boston: Allen Unwin, 1985), chs. 1–5; idem, Mor-
gan Grenfell 1838–1988: The Biography of a Merchant Bank (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1989), 103–34; Vincent P. Carosso, Investment Banking in America: A History (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press 1970), 204–07; Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan: An American
Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990),
ch. 10; Edward M. Lamont, Ambassador from Wall Street: The Story of Thomas W. Lamont,
J. P. Morgan’s Chief Executive (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1994), 67–85; Harold Nicolson,
Dwight Morrow (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935), 172–93; Roberts, “The American ‘Eastern
Establishment’ and World War I,” 247–61.
26 See Roberts, “‘Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?,’” 592–617.
27 See Roberts, “‘Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?,’” 605–06; Chandler, Benjamin Strong,
93–98; Paul P. Abrahams, “The Foreign Expansion of American Finance and Its Relationship to
the Foreign Economic Policies of the United States” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1967),
82–83; Sayers, Bank of England, 1:93. For details of these negotiations, see Strong diary and
letters during European trip of 1916, File 1000.2, Strong Papers; Munitions Hearings, 27:8239–
8252; exhibits 2354–2395, ibid., 8428–8455; File Federal Reserve Board–Bank of England 1915–
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Until American intervention in April 1917, he and Strong waged a persistent
battle as to whether Federal Reserve regulations should be framed and inter-
preted in such a way as to facilitate the Allies’ ability to ﬁnance their war
purchases in the American market. Perhaps not surprisingly, while both men
couched their arguments in terms of the best interests of the United States,
Strong invariably favored courses which would assist the Allies while War-
burg, though more neutral and paciﬁst than pro-German, supported measures
which would encourage the Allies to consider a negotiated peace settlement.
Initially, Strong was victorious; then, in late 1916 it seemed that Warburg and
his allies on the Federal Reserve Board, W. P. G. Harding, its chairman, and
Adolph C. Miller, a fellow governor, had ﬁnally triumphed, thanks to assistance
from President Woodrow Wilson. Shortly afterwards German determination to
wage unlimited submarine warfare on the United States impelled an American
declaration of war, and the whole issue became moot. Even so, it demonstrated
the manner in which noneconomic considerations, particularly sympathies for
one or another European country, could affect the judgment of ﬁgures within
the Federal Reserve System.28
To some degree this long-running debate preﬁgured Strong’s continuing
pattern of behavior during most of the 1920s, when he habitually gave in-
ternational considerations a high priority. As early as 1916, Strong supported
postwar “disarmament” and “a formal, deﬁnite understanding between all the
great nations, including the United States, that differences between nations will
be settled without force and that settlement, if necessary, will be imposed upon
parties to disputes by a combination of the neutrals.”29 Moreover, he hoped
that this would rest upon a foundation of Anglo-Franco-American cooperation
and understanding, though he feared that for political reasons any such alliance
would have to remain informal.30 In negotiating the correspondent relationship
with the Bank of England, he told Lord Cunliffe, its governor, that he favored
such an arrangement not simply for commercial reasons, but also because he
“believed . . . that the world’s future very largely depends upon the character
of the understandings between your people and ours.”31
Whereas many pro-Ally Americans tended to believe that any lasting peace
settlement must be contingent on a conclusive Allied victory, in late 1916
Strong endorsed Woodrow Wilson’s attempts to bring about a negotiated peace
28 See Roberts, “‘Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?,”’ 585–620.
29 Strong to Warburg, December 15, 1916, File 211.3, Strong Papers; see also Strong to
Warburg, November 17, 1916, ibid., Strong, diary, March 28, 1916, File 1000.2, ibid.; Strong to
James Bryce, October 23, 1916, File 1111.3, ibid.
30 Strong, diary, March 28, 1916, File 1000.2, ibid.; Strong to Bryce, October 23, 1916, File
1111.3, ibid.
31 Strong to Cunliffe, December 3, 1918, File 1115.1, ibid.      
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settlement, provided that American inﬂuence was employed to win peace terms
favorable to the Allies.32 Even before this, he had opposed a punitive peace set-
tlement, arguing that “when the war stops—it should actually STOP,” whereas
the imposition of harsh economic terms upon Germany would effectively con-
tinue hostilities through nonmilitary channels and “lead to a renewal of the
very conditions which gave rise to the present war.”33 He warned his British
friend Lord Bryce, a former ambassador to the United States, that his country,
while willing in principle to participate in the postwar international settlement,
might well refuse to guarantee “peace arrangements in which was consciously
planted the germ of later strife.” In addition, he told Bryce, British attempts
to subjugate Germany economically might lend added force to the contentions
of those Americans who advocated commercial competition with Britain, and
that such policies would in any case be unworthy of England’s distinguished
and honorable diplomatic record.34
Strong was indeed concerned by proposals that the British and French
developed at the Paris Economic Conference of June 1916, which appeared
to envisage a protectionist trading bloc of the Allied nations. The meeting’s
recommendations included the postwar prohibition of trade with former enemy
states, the elimination of enemy ﬁrms in Allied countries, the common pooling
of the Allies’ natural resources, their cooperative purchase of raw materials
not otherwise available, restrictions on former enemy powers’ shipping, and
measures to encourage mutual trade among the former Allies.35 Although the
British contended that such an Allied economic bloc would be aimed only at
their quondam enemies, not at the United States, Strong warned British friends
that such commercially discriminatory measures would severely impede the
achievement of any type of postwar Anglo-American entente or cooperation.
He believed that if the United States “avoided trouble with Germany and kept
out of the war” such measures, although supposedly intended merely as anti-
German, “would inevitably be directed to some extent against us.” A free
trader, he also feared that proposals such as those advanced at the Paris Eco-
nomic Conference gave added weight to the arguments of those Americans
who supported protective tariffs, export trade combinations, “and other similar
projects, all possibly proper enough as weapons of defence, but which will,
I hope, not be required in order to face a world which has armed itself with
32 Strong to Bryce, January 12, 1917, File 1111.3, ibid.; see also Strong to J. H. Treman,
December 21, 1916, File 333.221, ibid. Somewhat erroneously, Strong believed that the German
leaders were willing, even eager, to make peace. Strong to W. P. G. Harding, November 20, 1916,
Munitions Hearings, 31:9674.
33 Strong, diary, March 9, 1916, File 1000.2, Strong Papers.
34 Strong to Bryce, October 23, 1916, File 1111.3, ibid.
35 See Parrini, Heir to Empire, 15–17; Gerd Hardach, The First World War, 1914–1918
(London: Penguin, 1977), 237–41; Kaufman, Efﬁciency and Expansion, 166–75.      
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every political contrivance for a commercial strife to be carried to the point of
extermination.”36
Strong’s attitude towards European reconstruction was thus moderate and
pragmatic, but he never doubted that the United States should participate in
this enterprise. From before American intervention until his death, Strong re-
mained dedicated to the cause of facilitating European recovery. Inevitably, one
consequence of this would be a great increase in U.S. international ﬁnancial
activities, a development consonant with Strong’s long-time interest in building
up the United States as a world economic power. After American intervention,
he stated publicly, repeating his utterances while his country was still neutral,
that the United States would possess the only large resources of postwar capital
available to ﬁnance Europe’s economic recovery.37
When the war ended, Strong continued to state the case for the provision
of American capital to ﬁnance European recovery, both as immediate long-
dated credit for food and raw materials to tide Europe over the impending
winter of 1919–1920, and longer-term loans and investment capital to facilitate
economic redevelopment. Like many leading American bankers, at the end of
the war Strong believed that economic reconstruction was far more vital to the
restoration of European stability than the settlement of political questions. As
he had earlier, Strong opposed a Carthaginian peace, supporting the imposition
of a relatively moderate, rather than harshly retributive, reparations settlement
on Germany. He also supported the reduction or even cancellation of the war
debts that the Allies owed the United States.38 He called for speedy ratiﬁcation
of the Treaty of Versailles, even if some of its terms were imperfect, on the
grounds that until this took place the maintenance of a technical state of war
with Germany would reinforce American businessmen’s prevailing uncertainty
as to European conditions, discouraging private American investment in Eu-
rope. He also hoped that after ratiﬁcation the League of Nations machinery
would provide some of the administrative infrastructure needed to accomplish
economic reconstruction and solve such problems as German reparations and
Allied war debts.
In the long term, Strong hoped for extensive American private investment
in Europe, which he believed should be predicated upon European govern-
ments’ return to strict ﬁnancial discipline, balanced budgets, governmental
economy, currency stabilization, minimal state intervention, and the removal
36 Strong, “Interview with Lord Kitchener,” March 24, 1916, File 1000.2, Strong Papers;
Strong, diary, March 28, 1916, ibid.; Strong to Bryce, October 23, 1916, File 1111.3, ibid.
37 Strong, “An Appeal to Buy Bonds,” address at mass meeting at the Metropolitan Opera
House, New York City, September 27, 1918, in Interpretations, 53.
38 See Strong, “Memoranda,” on inter-Allied debts and reparations, Strong to Lefﬁngwell,
July 31, 1919, Strong, “Memorandum,” August 30, 1919, Strong, diary, September 13, 1919, all
in File 1000.3, Strong Papers.      
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of preferential tariff barriers. In the short term, Strong argued, the American
government should be prepared to extend some credits to European business-
men and governments, to tide them over their immediate difﬁculties.39 Strong
even expected the U.S. government to write off some such assistance, telling
Russell C. Lefﬁngwell, the Under Secretary of the Treasury who later became
a leading Morgan partner, that “a part of the problem can be dealt with on a
business basis and a part of it must be dealt with on an eleemosynary basis.”40
In 1919 several American bankers to whom Strong was close, including
his old friend Paul Warburg and Fred I. Kent, the president of the Bankers
Trust Company, together with leading British and Dutch ﬁnanciers, were in-
strumental in drafting the Amsterdam Memorial, signed by J. P. Morgan, Jr.,
as well as many leading European and American statesmen, bankers, and in-
dustrialists. This international petition called for the extension of large-scale
American credits and loans to European governments and businesses, lenient
intergovernmental debt settlements, a reparations assessment relatively gener-
ous to Germany, and a readiness on the part of both Americans and Europeans
to make sacriﬁces for these ends. Strong ﬁrmly approved of the Memorial’s
prescriptions, although he declined to sign it, on the grounds that “my rela-
tions with our treasury department [are] of such an intimate character that I
feared the possibility of its being misunderstood and causing embarrassment
which would, of course, have done harm rather than help the effort.”41 The
Amsterdam Memorial led the League of Nations in December 1920 to endorse
the ter Meulen plan, named after a Dutch banker, which called for European
governments to issue bonds that could be used to guarantee private credits to
ﬁnance Europe’s recovery. Although he had some reservations as to the degree
of statism this undertaking involved, Strong suggested that American bankers
might participate if their own government was prepared to take “an active and
ofﬁcial part in the plans for European reconstruction.”42
As early as 1921 Strong was eager to cooperate with other central banks
to devise schemes to facilitate Europe’s economic recovery, probably through
a variety of private credits guaranteed by European governments. At this
time Charles Evans Hughes, the Secretary of State, refused to permit him to
39 Strong to Lefﬁngwell, July 31, August 21, 30, 1919, Strong, “Memorandum,” August 30,
1919, Strong to Harding, September 11, 1919, File 1000.3, Strong Papers; Strong to Norman,
March 20, 1920, File 1116.1, ibid.
40 Strong to Lefﬁngwell, July 31, 1919, File 1000.3, ibid.
41 Strong to G. Vissering, March 29, 1920, File 1150.0, ibid.; for the drafts and text of the
memorial and much correspondence among its supporters, see the materials in Box 17, Warburg
Papers; the Warburg Memorial Collection, Boxes 18 and 19, Record Group 56, Records of the
Department of the Treasury, National Archives II, College Park, MD; and Boxes 20 and 22,
Robert H. Brand Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, England.
42 Strong to Hoover, June 9, 1921, quoted in Wueschner, Charting Twentieth-Century Mon-
etary Policy, 27.      
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undertake such activities.43 Strong also continued to urge Anglo-American ﬁ-
nancial and economic cooperation in promoting European economic recovery.44
He remained anxious that ﬁnancial and commercial rivalries should not disrupt
Anglo-American harmony. Noting Britain’s eagerness to attract American credit
and investment capital, Strong suggested to Lord Cunliffe, Montagu Norman’s
predecessor as governor of the Bank of England, that “if this problem is ap-
proached in a friendly and cooperative spirit they [the British] are the one
nation in the world to which credit will be freely given here, because, after all,
it is the English businessman and banker that we trust.”45 Writing to Norman
the same day, Strong stated: “I believe the greatest difﬁculty comes from a fear
on the part of your London bankers of the [Sir Edward] Holden [chairman of
the London City and Midland Bank] type that we are going to encroach upon
the English banking preserves. Frankly, I don’t see how it can be avoided for a
time because when the period of unsettlement is over we are going to have the
reserve of banking in this country and it is bound to ﬁnd an outlet.”46 Writing
in 1920 to an ofﬁcial of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Strong stated
that their institution “should always have it in mind” that its policies could
adversely affect the British. “By this I do not mean to suggest that our policy
should be shaped with regard to their interests, but rather that when our policy
does appear to impose hardship upon them, the least we can do with such an
intimate association is to keep them advised and give them some explanation
of the reasons for our course.”47
As Strong’s words suggest, and as the 1920s would demonstrate, however
fervent his personal commitment to internationalism, the parameters within
which he and the Federal Reserve System operated imposed distinct restrictions
upon the degree to which he could make European recovery and stabilization
his ﬁrst priority. He could not ignore political pressures, internecine sectional
disputes among American bankers and within the Federal Reserve System, and
the domestic demands of the U.S. economy. Strong was also ﬁrmly wedded to
orthodox, pre-Keynesian economic tenets rooted in the thinking of the prewar
era. His policies in the decade after the war would demonstrate both the am-
bitious scope of internationalist central banking objectives in the United States
and the de facto obstacles to their attainment.
43 See Wueschner, Charting Twentieth-Century Monetary Policy, 27–32.
44 Strong to Russell C. Lefﬁngwell, July 31, 1919, File 1000.3, Strong Papers; Strong to
Montagu Norman, November 22, 1918, February 5, May 21, 1919, File 1116.1, ibid., Strong to
Lord Cokayne, May 23, 1919, File 1115.2, ibid.
45 Strong to Cunliffe, February 5, 1919, File 1115.1, ibid.
46 Strong to Norman, February 1919, File 1116.1, ibid.; cf. Strong to Norman, November
22, 1918, May 2, 1919, ibid.; Strong to Cunliffe, December 3, 1918, Cunliffe to Strong, January
5, 1919, File 1115.1, ibid.; Strong to Lefﬁngwell, July 25, 31, 1919, Strong, diary, July 28, 1919,
File 1000.3, ibid.
47 Strong to Pierre Jay, March 30, 1920, File 320.113, ibid.        
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1. BENJAMIN STRONG: CONTEMPORARY VIEWS
Controversial in life, the dominating ﬁgure of Benjamin Strong, ﬁrst governor
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, continues to precipitate debate
long after his death in 1928. “There are,” intoned former President Herbert
Hoover, “crimes far worse than murder for which men should be reviled and
punished.”1 Perhaps slightly biased by the fact that the Great Depression had
ruined his presidency, he was referring to what he perceived as deﬁciencies in
Federal Reserve policy during the 1920s. In particular, Hoover believed that the
United States Federal Reserve System, most of whose members he unkindly
characterized as “mediocrities,” had been overly inﬂuenced by the priorities of
its dominant ﬁgure, Benjamin Strong. Describing Strong as “a mental annex to
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Europe,” Hoover laid much of the blame for the stock market crash of 1929
and the subsequent Great Depression on the governor’s deep commitment to
facilitating Europe’s economic recovery from the damage done by the First
World War. During the 1920s, the majority of Europe’s governments, led by
Great Britain, returned to the gold standard. Britain’s insistence on doing so
at what Hoover termed a “ﬁctitious rate” of $4.86 to the pound sterling, in
his opinion far too high, and Strong’s acquiescence in these policies, in turn
led Strong to expand American credit by keeping American discount rates
relatively low and manipulating the Reserve System’s open market operations.
The rationale for this was that keeping interest rates lower in the United States
than in Britain eased pressures on sterling and enabled the Bank of England,
whose governor, Montagu Norman, was Strong’s closest friend, to maintain an
overvalued pound. Hoover ascribed Strong’s policies to what he viewed as the
malign persuasions of Norman and other central bankers, especially Hjalmar
Schacht of the Reichsbank and Charles Rist of the Bank of France. He be-
lieved that due to Strong’s unwise predilections, from the mid-1920s onward
the United States experienced credit inﬂation, which fuelled the stock market
bubble that collapsed in the Great Crash of 1929. Although Hoover suggested
that other economic weaknesses, including a “weak banking system” and the
low purchasing power of farmers and white-collar employees, contributed to
this, he argued that imprudent Federal Reserve policies bore the primary re-
sponsibility for the crash and the Depression.2
Hoover was not alone among Strong’s contemporaries in expressing the
view that Strong’s efforts to aid Britain’s return to the gold standard laid the
foundation for the Depression by triggering stock market speculation. At the
onset of the Great Depression, Russell C. Lefﬁngwell, a leading partner in the
investment bank J. P. Morgan and Company, agreed with those who condemned
Strong’s policies and ascribed to them at least some responsibility for the boom
and ﬁnal crash of that decade’s second half. Lefﬁngwell did so even though
Strong had close ties to the Morgan banking ﬁrm, which had provided much
of the ﬁnancing for European nations’ stabilization efforts.3
Within the Federal Reserve System, Strong’s rate policies of the mid-1920s
also provoked substantial regional opposition, particularly from midwestern and
agricultural elements, who generally endorsed Hoover’s subsequent analysis.4
It is generally accepted that in 1924 Strong engineered low interest rates in the
United States, which by making the dollar and sterling respectively less and
more attractive to investors drove up the foreign exchange value of the British
2 Ibid., 2–15, quotations from 8 and 9.
3 Lefﬁngwell to Lamont, August 29, 1931, File 102-15, Thomas W. Lamont Papers, Baker
Library, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA; cf. Lefﬁngwell to Lamont, March 8, 1929, File
102-13, ibid.; Lefﬁngwell to Lamont, May 29, 1929, File 103-14, ibid.
4 See note 10, below.      
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currency and facilitated Britain’s return to the gold standard.5 The records not
only of Strong’s correspondence with Montagu Norman, but also the Bank
of England’s ﬁles on relations with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
reveal how closely British and American bankers kept in touch on their re-
spective discount rates.6 Throughout the 1920s, two of the Federal Reserve
Board’s directors, Adolph C. Miller, a professional economist, and Charles S.
Hamlin, perennially disapproved of the degree to which they believed Strong
subordinated domestic to international considerations; indeed, they and Strong
had generally disagreed over Federal Reserve policies ever since all three men
joined the System in 1914.7 In 1925 Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce
and in the early 1920s an ally of Strong’s in the quest to bring about European
economic recovery, also demonstrated great reservations toward Strong’s policy
of reducing United States rates in order to facilitate Britain’s return to gold at
its prewar parity, and worked behind the scenes to precipitate congressional
questioning of its wisdom.8
The issue of government control over foreign loans also brought Strong—
and other New York bankers—into direct conﬂict with the Secretary of Com-
merce, clashes which probably contributed to Hoover’s later antagonism to-
wards Strong. Indeed, one consequence of their disputes was that after mid-1922
the two men, once fairly close collaborators, ended their formerly extensive
correspondence, generally communicated through intermediaries, and only met
on one subsequent occasion, in November 1923.9 Hoover believed that the U.S.
government should have the ﬁnal say as to whether a foreign loan was in the
national interest, and demanded that American bankers obtain preapproval of
5 Strong to Andrew Mellon, May 27, 1924, File Gold (Miscellaneous), 1922–1925, Box 86,
Record Group 56, Records of the Department of the Treasury, National Archives II, College Park,
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Press, 1963), 282–284, 288; Elmus R. Wicker, Federal Reserve Monetary Policy 1917–1933
(New York: Random House, 1966), 80, 89–90; R. S. Sayers, The Bank of England, 1891–1944,
3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), I:139–40; Sir Henry Clay, Lord Norman
(London: Macmillan, 1967), 140–44; Boyle, Montagu Norman (New York: Weybright and Talley,
1967), 183–84; Silvano A. Wueschner, Charting Twentieth-Century Monetary Policy: Herbert
Hoover and Benjamin Strong, 1917–1927 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 57, 75–85;
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(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 191–92.
6 See correspondence in Series OV31 and OV32, Bank of England Archives, London;
Strong’s extensive correspondence with Norman, Files 1116.1–1116.8, Benjamin Strong Papers,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York.
7 See Chandler, Benjamin Strong, 44–45 and pass.; Donald F. Kettl, Leadership at the Fed
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 24–25, 33–35; Wueschner, Charting Twentieth-Century
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all such loans from the Department of Commerce. He was also eager to demand
that the proceeds of American loans should be spent on American products.
Like most of his fellow bankers, Strong opposed all such restrictions, view-
ing them as an undesirable extension of government supervision over aspects
of the economy that should be left to the free market. In correspondence with
Hoover and others, Strong expressed his views at length. The outcome was that
American bankers found themselves obliged to notify the State Department of
all foreign issues; the department could and sometimes did object to them on
grounds of the national interest, but Hoover’s attempts to force borrowers to
spend the proceeds in the United States failed.10
The most notorious episode of monetary ease, however, occurred in July
and August 1927, when Strong, though alarmed by the American market’s
speculative and inﬂationary tendencies, nonetheless forced through the Federal
Reserve System a decrease in the discount rate from 4 to 3 percent. This
move relieved the excessive pressures to which the initial level of American
interest rates was subjecting the dangerously shaky pound. In July 1927 the
central bankers of Great Britain, the United States, France, and Germany had
met on Long Island in the United States to discuss means of strengthening
Britain’s gold reserves and the general European currency situation. Strong’s
reduction of discount rates and purchase of L - 12 million of sterling, for which
he paid the Bank of England in gold, appear to have been the direct result of
this conference. Indeed, according to Charles Rist, one of the French bankers
who attended, Strong said that the American authorities would reduce discount
rates as “un petit coup de whisky for the stock exchange.”11 Strong pushed this
reduction through the Federal Reserve System despite strong opposition not
just from Miller, but also from James McDougal, the governor of the Chicago
Federal Reserve Bank, who represented Midwestern bankers who generally
10 Strong, diary, August 6, 1919, File 1000.3, Strong Papers; Strong to S. Parker Gilbert,
May 23, 1921, File 012.5, ibid.; Strong to Gilbert, June 2, 1921, File Federal Reserve Board
1921, Box 70, Record Group 56, National Archives II; Strong to Charles Evans Hughes, April
14, 1922, File 800.51/312, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, National
Archives II, College Park, MD; memorandum by Strong, attached to Hoover to Hughes, April
29, 1922, 800.51/316, ibid.; Gilbert to Strong, October 18, 1925, enclosing Gilbert to Secretary
of State, October 16, 1925, and Gilbert to Garrard B. Winston, October 18, 1925, Strong to
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of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), 188–94; Michael J. Hogan, Informal Entente: The Private Structure
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of Missouri Press, 1977), 98, 100; Herbert Hoover, The Hoover Memoirs, Vol. 2 The Cabinet
and the Presidency 1920–1933 (London: Hollis and Carter, 1952), 85–91; Wueschner, Charting
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11 See Chandler, Benjamin Strong, 375–77; Clarke, Central Bank Cooperation, 123–24; Say-
ers, Bank of England, 1:336–345; Clay, Lord Norman, 236–37; Boyle, Montagu Norman, 231;
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did not share New York’s preoccupation with international ﬁnancial markets.
Indeed, the Chicago Bank only reduced its rates when the Federal Reserve
Board ordered it to do so.12
In a conﬁdential memorandum written shortly afterwards for use at a meet-
ing of the Federal Advisory Council, Strong speciﬁcally denied that his close
relationship with the Bank of England had affected his policy choice on this
issue. The rate reduction had, he claimed, facilitated European purchases of
America’s “marginal production of export goods,” the market for which would
disappear should European currencies collapse. He also cited, as he had on
numerous earlier occasions since the First World War, the menace of domestic
American inﬂation were Europe to ship over excessive amounts of gold.13 Yet
Frank Altschul, a leading partner in the New York branch of the multinational
investment bank Lazard Freres, told Emile Moreau, the governor of the Bank of
France, “that the reasons given by Mr. Strong as justiﬁcation for the reduction
in the discount rate are being taken seriously by no one, and that everyone in
the United States is convinced that Mr. Strong wanted to aid Mr. Norman by
supporting the pound.”14 Other correspondence in Strong’s own ﬁles suggests
that he was giving priority to international conditions rather than to American
exporters’ needs. Writing to Norman, who praised his handling of the affair as
“masterly,” Strong described the rate reduction as “our year[’]s contribution to
reconstruction.”15
2. STRONG AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION:
THE CURRENT DEBATE
Since the 1930s, economic historians have focused on Strong’s central role
in setting early Federal Reserve policies; the likely relationship between these
policies to the Great Depression; the possibility that, had he lived, Strong might
have averted the slump; and Strong’s involvement in international economic
12 Strong’s own version is given in Strong, “The Chicago Rate Controversy,” September 11,
1927, File 320.121, Strong Papers. Accounts may also be found in Chandler, Benjamin Strong,
438–55; Clarke, Central Bank Cooperation, 124–34; Wicker, Federal Reserve Monetary Policy,
106–16; Wicker, “Federal Reserve Monetary Policy,” 336–37; Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary
History, 288–89; Sayers, Bank of England, 1:340–341; Clay, Lord Norman, 237; Boyle, Montagu
Norman, 231; John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929, reprint ed. (Boston: Houghton
Mifﬂin, 1997), 55; Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 211–14; Wueschner, Charting Twentieth-Century
Monetary Policy, 136–37, 140–45.
13 Strong, “The Chicago Rate Controversy,” September 11, 1927, File 321.121, Strong
Papers.
14 See Emile Moreau, The Golden Franc: Memoirs of a Governor of the Bank of France:
The Stabilization of the Franc (1926–1928) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 343, diary
entry for August 24, 1927.
15 Strong to Norman, August 9, 1927, Norman to Strong, August 11, 1927, File 1116.7,
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affairs, especially central banks’ efforts during the 1920s to restore international
currency stability.
Several historians have suggested that Strong’s economic policies during
the 1920s were fundamentally sound and that, had he survived, he might well
have taken more decisive action than did his successors in the Federal Reserve
System to deal with the slump that developed into the Great Depression. In their
Monetary History of the United States, Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz
argue that the root cause of the Great Depression was the Federal Reserve
System’s “great contraction” of money in the late 1920s and the early 1930s.
Indeed, they even suggest that the term ‘Great Contraction’ should replace the
traditional nomenclature of ‘Great Depression.’ Friedman and Schwartz under-
mine one of Hoover’s major arguments when they point out that the 1920s
were a period of minimal inﬂation when the monetary expansion failed even
to match the growth in national income. They agree with Hoover, however, in
ascribing to Strong a dominating position within the System, certainly that of
ﬁrst among equals. In their view, “foreign considerations were rarely important
in determining the policies followed but were cited as additional justiﬁcation
for policies adopted primarily on domestic grounds whenever foreign and do-
mestic considerations happened to coincide.”16 Moreover, one of the major
problems affecting Federal Reserve monetary policy was that after Strong’s
death in 1928, the System suffered a year of stasis, since a “dispute [over
raising the discount rate] between the [Federal Reserve] Board and the New
York Bank largely paralyzed monetary policy during almost the whole of the
important year 1929.” While tensions between the Board and the member banks
had always existed, “So long as Benjamin Strong was alive, his unquestioned
preeminence kept the struggle submerged. . . . Strong’s death in October 1928,
preceded by a few months of inactivity, triggered a phase of overt conﬂict.”
Although Friedman and Schwartz attribute the onset of the Depression to the
collapse of the banking system, they also believe that Strong’s absence was a
major reason for the inadequate Federal Reserve response.17
Lester V. Chandler largely agrees with Friedman and Schwartz, arguing as
they do that by raising interest rates and contracting money and credit in the late
1920s, the Federal Reserve System initiated the deﬂationary monetary policy
that led to the Great Depression. As the Depression developed, the System
only half-heartedly relaxed its monetary stringency. As a result, between 1929
and 1932 the money supply effectively fell by almost 25 percent and thereby
created a vicious spiral of continuous intensiﬁcation of the Great Depression’s
effects. For most of 1929, inconclusive battle was joined within the Federal
16 See Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, chs. 5, 6, 7, quotation from 269; Milton
Friedman, “Real and Pseudo Gold Standards,” Journal of Law and Economics 5:1 (October 1961),
68–70.
17 Quotations from Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, 255.      
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Reserve System as to whether commercial paper resulting from the ﬁnancing of
“speculative” transactions should be eligible for discount, with several members
of the Board, notably the two long-time directors Adolph Miller and Charles
Hamlin, arguing that ruling it ineligible would discourage stock speculation.
According to Chandler, then, in the early 1930s the Fed radically failed to meet
the needs of the economy, thereby helping to precipitate the greatest contraction
in United States history.18 The popular historian John Brooks suggests that, had
Strong “been given another year of life, his full attention would surely have
focused on the American situation and his ﬁrm hand might have done much to
set things to rights in time.”19 Although Chandler rather hedges his bets, the
ﬁnal pages of his biography of Strong seem to endorse this viewpoint, as does
an article by the economist Robert L. Hetzel.20
Historical debate still continues as to whether Strong’s concern to facilitate
European economic recovery compromised the American economy and, in par-
ticular, led him to subordinate United States monetary policies to the demands
of European reconstruction. Chandler, Strong’s sole biographer to date, tends
to favor this approach.21 The economist John Kenneth Galbraith, by contrast,
goes so far as to describe as “formidable nonsense” the view that Strong’s
1927 determination to lower discount rates in the United States was “an act
of generous but ill-advised internationalism” that ultimately caused the Great
Depression.22
An assessment minimizing the impact of Strong’s death is given in work
by Meltzer and Karl Brunner, Silvano Wueschner, and Elmus R. Wicker. While
stressing different economic factors, they alike tend to downplay the role of
Strong. Wicker argues that consistent policies were followed throughout the
1920s, both before and after Strong’s demise, and that changes in gold ﬂows
and international monetary relations were primarily responsible both for the
Federal Reserve’s successes during the greater part of the 1920s and for its
failure to respond adequately to the Great Depression.23 Brunner and Meltzer
emphasize the Federal Reserve System’s continuing reluctance to make sub-
stantial open market purchases, with the resulting constriction upon the money
18 See Lester V. Chandler, America’s Greatest Depression 1929–1941 (New York: Harper &
Row, 1970), chs. 5 and 7; cf. Friedman, “Real and Pseudo Gold Standards,” 70–72.
19 See John Brooks, Once in Golconda: A True Drama of Wall Street 1920–1938 (New York:
Harper & Row, 1969), 98–99.
20 See Chandler, Benjamin Strong, 457 ff; Robert L. Hetzel, “The Rules versus Discretion
Debate over Monetary Policy in the 1920s,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review
71 (November/December 1985), 3–14.
21 See Chandler, Benjamin Strong.
22 See Galbraith, Great Crash, 9, 11.
23 See Elmus R. Wicker, “Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1922–33: A Reinterpretation,”
Journal of Political Economy, 73:4 (August 1965), 325–43; idem, Federal Reserve Monetary
Policy.       
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supply, as the primary factor; again, they suggest that these policies were similar
to those the Federal Reserve System had followed throughout the 1920s, and
that it was their timing, not the inherent wisdom of the protagonists, that made
their impact so disparate.24
Elmus R. Wicker and Silvano A. Wueschner defend Strong against charges
that his policies neglected U.S. interests, yet question the thesis that he would
have been successful in combating the Great Depression. Wicker suggests that
Strong had a sophisticated appreciation of the importance of international fac-
tors to the U.S. economy, and that, far from being “quixotic,” his policies were
inspired by a prudent concern for his own country’s interests. Wicker also
argues that Strong’s fundamental commitment to the gold standard precluded
any likelihood that he would have done better than his successors in countering
the Great Depression.25
Wueschner’s recent study Charting Twentieth-Century Monetary Policy
likewise portrays Strong as the representative of New York ﬁnancial interests,
and his support for European stabilization and Britain’s return to gold as “re-
quired if the involvement of the American banking community in international
ﬁnance and debt settlements was to yield the current and future returns that it
gave promise of yielding.” He also confesses himself skeptical that, had Strong
not died, he would have provided vigorous and successful leadership in the
subsequent ﬁnancial crisis.26 Wueschner not only draws attention to Strong’s
dominating personality but also illuminates those conﬂicts that arose between
Strong and New York ﬁnancial forces on the one hand and agricultural, inte-
rior interests within the United States, and those between Strong and Herbert
Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce. Wueschner brings out the manner in
which disputes among Board members, including Adolph C. Miller as well as
Hoover and Strong, over the primacy of domestic or international considerations
in the setting of Federal Reserve policy, continued from the time of the First
World War throughout the 1920s and culminated in the famous 1927–1928
debates over Federal Reserve discount policy. He pays particular attention to
the close relationship between Strong and Norman. He also makes it clear that
the National City Bank, New York’s largest commercial bank, did not ascribe
the same primacy to international recovery as did Strong and the Morgan in-
vestment banking interests with whom he was closely associated. Wueschner
argues that internecine Federal Reserve System policy disputes “contributed
24 See Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, “What Did We Learn from the Monetary Expe-
rience of the United States in the Great Depression?” Canadian Journal of Economics 1 (1968),
334–48, reprinted in Allan H. Meltzer, Money, Credit and Policy (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing, 1995), 104–18.
25 See Wicker, “Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1922-33,” 325–43; idem, Federal Reserve
Monetary Policy.
26 See Wueschner, Charting Twentieth-Century Monetary Policy, 161.       
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in some degree to the inability of the system to develop a coherent Federal
Reserve policy that could provide the regulatory instrumentality that the nation
needed.”27
Yet another respected historian goes so far as to ascribe at least part of the
responsibility for the Great Depression and Europe’s ﬁnancial collapse in the
early 1930s to Strong’s dominating ﬁgure. Barry Eichengreen’s massive recent
work Golden Fetters argues forcefully that the overall strategy of European
interwar reconstruction was misguided and that its reliance on the restoration
of the gold standard created an unduly rigid economic system which itself
precipitated the Great Depression and was then unable to remedy the situa-
tion. Eichengreen, one of Strong’s most severe critics, suggests that the deep
commitment of Strong, Norman, and other international bankers to returning
the pound, the mark, and European currencies to the gold standard at overly
high parities, which they were then forced to maintain at all costs, including
deﬂationary policies, had the effect of undercutting Europe’s postwar recovery.
Not only did Strong and his fellows help through their policies to precipitate the
Great Depression, but their continuing attachment to gold acted as a straitjacket
conﬁning economic and ﬁscal policies within narrow bounds that effectively
precluded expansionist options. Eichengreen draws attention to the inﬂexibility
that was one result of the gold standard and to the manner in which bankers’
desire to protect their national currencies’ convertibility into gold at almost any
cost drastically limited the options available to them when responding to the
crisis. He argues that in 1927 Strong’s narrow reliance on the gold standard,
which emphasized the ﬁnancial predominance of the United States—the pos-
sessor of by far the greatest holdings of gold in the world—as opposed to a
broader-based gold-exchange standard, which would have permitted the use of
both foreign exchange reserves and gold to back national currencies, exacer-
bated nascent international economic problems. Eichengreen also implies that
in 1928 Strong might well have been more daring in reducing discount rates in
the United States and that the Federal Reserve System’s later reluctance to do
so, its determination to force “liquidation” of all assets, greatly enhanced the
Great Depression’s severity and severely affected European countries. At the
same time, Eichengreen points out that to adopt any other course might well
have been more difﬁcult for Strong in the post-1928 period, since whereas
before that time there was relatively little conﬂict or incompatibility between
the System’s domestic and international objectives, at least where American
interest rates were concerned, after 1928 this was no longer the case.28
Peter Temin lays much of the responsibility for the crisis upon the Great
War and its impact on the international monetary system. Like Eichengreen,
27 Ibid., quotation from 130.
28 See Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, esp. chs. 4–10.        
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he suggests that the international gold standard itself was one of the major
factors underlying and reinforcing the Great Depression, since “the conditions
that had sustained it before the war no longer existed.”29 Temin agrees with
Wicker that Strong’s fundamental commitment to the gold standard precluded
any likelihood that he would have done better than his successors in counter-
ing the Great Depression.30 Charles P. Kindleberger even questions the image
of Strong as a dominating ﬁgure who set a clear objective, referring to the
“Hamlet-like indecision” of his policies toward stock market speculation in
1927 and 1928.31
3. STRONG AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONALISM
Whatever historians’ speciﬁc opinions of Strong’s policies, he is clearly a ﬁg-
ure whom students of pre-1930 Federal Reserve policies cannot ignore. This
essay does not propose to answer the fundamentally irresoluble question of
whether, had he lived, Strong might have prevented the Great Depression. It
does, however, address the issue of the degree to which Strong’s international-
ist predilections inﬂuenced him in setting domestic monetary policy. Overall,
it seems that while international considerations undoubtedly ranked high in
Strong’s order of priorities, clearly deﬁned limitations restricted his commit-
ment to assisting Europe, and these boundaries broadly reﬂected the nature of
and constraints upon American internationalism in the interwar period.
For Strong, European reconstruction was not simply a policy but a cause,
almost a religious faith. In 1927 he told Norman:
Long ago I had reason to ponder the question whether I would allow dis-
couragements to dissuade me from favoring a constructive attitude toward
reconstruction abroad. There have been many and serious ones, at times, and
many reasons, as well as temptations to quit and let the old world solve its
own problems.
Considering everything, (and that included personal satisfaction and the
like) I decided to allow no discouragements to alter our position. It has at
times involved serious risks to my own position and prestige in the System
and the country.32
According to Hoover’s bitter post-presidential charges, Strong recklessly placed
the interests of the international ﬁnancial system ahead of United States domes-
tic concerns. In practice, the picture was more complex, reﬂecting the distinct
29 See Peter Temin, Lessons from the Great Depression (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989),
quotation from 25.
30 Ibid., 34–35.
31 See Charles P. Kindleberger, Essays in History: Financial, Economic, Personal (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 13.
32 Strong to Norman, August 9, 1927, File 1116.7, Strong Papers.       
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boundaries of Strong’s commitment to European recovery and the limitations
that broadly characterized the outlook of most contemporary internationalists,
bankers among them, as well as the inﬂuence of political constraints. These, in
turn, illuminate the signiﬁcant differences that generally distinguished interwar
American internationalism from the variety that prevailed after the Second
World War.
There is no reason to doubt that Strong believed his work for European
currency stabilization also promoted the best interests of the United States. He
argued frequently that uncertain exchange rates, especially when the dollar was
at a premium against other currencies, made it difﬁcult for American exporters
to price their goods competitively.33 As he had done during the war, on numer-
ous later occasions Strong also stressed the importance of preventing an inﬂux
of gold into the United States and consequent domestic inﬂation; to avoid this,
Strong argued, Americans should make loans to Europe, pursue lenient debt
policies, and accept European imports.34
Neither Strong nor his friend Norman appears ever to have questioned the
parities at which they stabilized ﬁrst the mark and then sterling; rather, they
accepted that returning the pound to gold at prewar exchange rates was likely
to require British deﬂation and American efforts to use lower United States
interest rates to alleviate pressures on sterling. In 1931 Lefﬁngwell wrote to
Thomas W. Lamont, a fellow Morgan partner:
You will remember that when Monty [Norman] came over to discuss with us
plans for the return to the gold standard, I asked him whether it was politically
possible for the Bank of England to raise the bank rate from time to time to
defend her gold and to complete the operation. He assured me that it was.
He was mistaken about this. The general strike soon followed and instead of
Monty’s defending the gold standard and completing the deﬂation on classical
lines by making money dearer in England, he called upon Ben to defend it
33 Strong to Junnosuke Inouye, August 29, 1921, File 1330.1, ibid.; Strong to William Hailey,
October 24, 1921, File 1112.5, ibid.; Strong to Herbert Hoover, April 22, 1922, File 013.1, ibid.;
Strong to Mellon, May 27, 1924, File Gold (Miscellaneous) 1922–1925, Box 86, Record Group
56, National Archives II; Strong, “The Chicago Rate Controversy,” September 11, 1927, File
320.121, Strong Papers; memorandum written by Strong, December 25, 1924, included in “Open
Market Hearings,” extract from Strong’s testimony before a Hearing of the House Committee
on Banking and Currency, April 1926, in Strong, Interpretations of Federal Reserve Policy in
the Speeches and Writings of Benjamin Strong, ed. W. Randolph Burgess (New York: Harper
& Row, 1930), 256–61; Strong, “Credit Arrangement with the Bank of England,” extract from
his testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, April 1926, ibid., 275–90;
Chandler, Benjamin Strong, 266–68.
34 Strong to Hoover, April 22, 1922, File 013.1, Strong Papers; Strong to Mellon, May
27, 1924, File Gold (Miscellaneous) 1922–1925, Box 85, Record Group 56, National Archives
II; Strong, “The Reconstruction of World Finance,” address before executive council, American
Bankers Association, October 3, 1922, in Interpretations, 146–47; Strong, “Prices and Price
Control,” unpublished article prepared by him in April 1923, ibid., 231–34.       
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by making it cheaper in America. This Ben did for Monty consistently and
persistently, and successfully until the return of France to the gold standard
in 1927 and her adoption of a deﬁnite deﬂation policy. This seemed to make
it necessary for Ben to adopt an active (instead of passive) inﬂation policy
in the latter part of that year. Ben’s long illness in 1928, and the stupidity
and stubborness [sic] of the Washington Federal Reserve Board in 1929, left
the inﬂation policy uncorrected until it was too late to correct it without the
disaster of September and October 1929.35
It should be noted that, Lefﬁngwell’s ex post facto criticisms notwithstand-
ing, in 1925 the Morgan ﬁrm had enthusiastically endorsed and provided a
credit facility to back Britain’s return to gold. Despite Lefﬁngwell’s effective
condemnation of Strong’s policies as inﬂationary, there is substantial evidence
to suggest that, in practice, Strong was generally cautious in assisting with
European recovery. Lefﬁngwell’s implicit suggestion that, had Strong survived,
Federal Reserve discount rate policies in 1928 would have followed a different
path can perhaps be viewed as a lefthanded tribute to Strong’s predominating
concern to protect his own country’s interests.
Lefﬁngwell’s assertions as to Strong’s easy money policy notwithstanding,
Strong often seems to have placed American domestic interests above those
of the international ﬁnancial system. Most notably, he was never prepared to
permit the vast quantities of gold that accrued in the United States during the
First World War and for most of the 1920s to trigger domestic inﬂation within
the United States, despite the fact that such policies would have greatly eased
the burdens which European nations faced in resuming the gold standard. As
early as July 1915, Strong went so far as to state that the enormous quantity
of gold with which the Allies had paid for many of their war supplies was
“deposited with us in trust until the tide turns when we probably will have to
let some part of it go to Europe.”36 In the interim, Strong made every effort to
ensure that the inﬂux of gold did not encourage domestic inﬂation, even though
the consequent price differential between the United States and Europe would
have greatly facilitated the ability of European nations to export to the United
States and hence would have hastened their economic recovery.
By preference, if no other considerations intervened, in the immediate post-
war period Strong was largely wedded to economic orthodoxy, and tended to
take a fairly hawkish and conservative line on raising the discount rate to damp
down inﬂationary and speculative tendencies. His policies therefore reﬂected
a delicate balancing act between international and domestic priorities. Just
35 Lefﬁngwell to Lamont, August 29, 1931, File 102-15, Lamont Papers; cf. Lefﬁngwell
to Lamont, March 8, 1929, File 102-13, ibid.; Lefﬁngwell to Lamont, May 29, 1929, enclosing
Lefﬁngwell to Edward C. Grenfell, May 29, 1929, File 103-14, ibid.
36 Strong to Fred I. Kent, July 10, 1915, U.S. Senate, 74 Cong., 2d Sess., Hearings Before the
Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, 40 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Ofﬁce, 1934–36), 30:9527; Strong, diary, March 28, 1916, File 1000.2, Strong Papers.      
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after the First World War, Strong was eager to raise discount rates, advocating
stringent monetary policies designed to drive down the soaring wartime cost
of living. His friend Russell Lefﬁngwell, then Under Secretary of the Treasury,
initially opposed this anti-inﬂationary policy, probably largely because it would
drive up the interest rates on Treasury certiﬁcates, thereby making government
ﬁnancing more expensive. In a classic example of bureaucratic politics, the
Treasury’s primary preoccupation was to reduce and eventually pay off the
high national debt that had accumulated during the war years. Carter Glass,
the Democratic politician who became Treasury Secretary in late 1918, may
also have feared the impact of higher increased rates and consequent deﬂation
on the outcome of the approaching presidential election. Early in 1920, after a
lengthy and sometimes heated dispute which nonetheless left their mutual re-
spect for each other undiminished, Lefﬁngwell joined Strong after the Treasury
had issued the Liberty bonds to ﬁnance long term the outstanding government
debt. The two men also sought to check increasing stock market speculation.37
A side effect of higher American interest rates was that the dollar rose
against other currencies, so that prospective European borrowers found the
cost of both American goods and the capital needed to ﬁnance economic re-
covery had risen. European debtors of the United States whose obligations were
denominated in dollars also faced increased payments. Intensifying European
misery, the ﬁnancial assistance which Strong and others had earlier urged the
American government to provide for European relief and reconstruction never
materialized. Federal Reserve rates were by no means the only factor which
contributed to the American recession of 1920–1921; tighter ﬁscal policy and
the cessation of most war-related government orders in mid-1919 were also
signiﬁcant, but deﬂationary rate policies magniﬁed their impact. Still, by De-
cember 1920 a visit to London had led Strong to fear the high rate policy had
37 Strong to Lefﬁngwell, February 6, 28, December 19, 1919, Lefﬁngwell to Strong, Feb-
ruary 6, October 8, 1919, File 012.4, Strong Papers; Lefﬁngwell, “Memorandum Concerning
Strong’s Conﬁdential Letter of December 19, 1919,” May 4, 1920, Lefﬁngwell to Charles A.
Morss, May 14, 1920, Letterbook 43b, Russell C. Lefﬁngwell Letterbooks, Manuscripts Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, DC; numerous other memoranda in the Lefﬁngwell letterbooks
for this period, copies of which are usually also in the File Federal Reserve Banks—Discount
Rates (Policy Letters) 1918–1920, Box 66, Record Group 56, National Archives II; Rixey Smith
and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass: A Biography (New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1939),
182–85; Chandler, Benjamin Strong, 148–69; Wicker, Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 33–
45; Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, 221–31; Wueschner, Charting Twentieth-Century
Monetary Policy, 10–17. Lefﬁngwell himself retrospectively minimized the signiﬁcance of this
debate, pointing out that those “trivial variations of rates” Strong suggested would not “have
been an appreciable factor towards the control of inﬂation.” He suggested, moreover, that once
the Treasury had decided that a genuine inﬂationary problem existed, it took the initiative in
early 1920 in raising discount rates to 6 percent. It was perhaps not entirely coincidental that
the Treasury decision to do so coincided with Glass’s departure. Lefﬁngwell to S. Parker Gilbert,
March 1, 1922, File Federal Reserve Banks—Discount Rates (Policy Letters) 1922, Box 66,
Record Group 56, National Archives II.      
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been carried to the point at which the high price of American capital was endan-
gering the prospects for European recovery, and he was prepared to recommend
a decrease in rates. Although for some months afterward American domestic
conditions caused him to retreat from this suggestion and leave discount rates
as they were, in autumn 1921 the Federal Reserve System adopted, possibly—
though this is uncertain—on Strong’s suggestion, what he described as “a rather
aggressive program towards easing up money conditions, not entirely in our
own interest but somewhat in the interest of world recovery.”38
Over time Strong’s commitment to European recovery apparently inten-
siﬁed appreciably, but limits remained. Most signiﬁcantly, Strong was not
prepared to countenance major price inﬂation in the United States even to
facilitate Britain’s return to gold. Eichengreen has suggested that a major factor
undercutting Britain’s return to gold was the Federal Reserve System’s policy of
“sterilizing” gold imports, i.e., through sales of government securities reducing
the money supply by the amount of the additional gold received. By preventing
inﬂation in the United States, which such gold shipments would otherwise have
precipitated, these policies made it almost impossible for European countries
suffering from a balance of payments deﬁcit to reverse the process, as their own
products became cheaper. Had Strong been prepared to countenance inﬂation
in the United States, the price differential between the two countries would
have shrunk, making it unnecessary for Britain to adopt such stringent and
deﬂationary monetary policies in the quest to return to gold.39
Even though by the mid-1920s this situation had persisted for ten years,
Strong may still have regarded—or at least found it convenient to regard—the
American gold stockpile as a temporary phenomenon, soon to be liquidated
by the vast upsurge in U.S. loans and investments in Europe that began in
1923 and which he believed Britain’s return to gold would further encourage.
(Like most international bankers, he expected subsequent European recovery
to generate increased European exports to the United States.)40 Moreover, in
fairness to Strong, in 1924 he suggested to Andrew Mellon, the Secretary of
the Treasury, that to facilitate Britain’s return to gold, it would be necessary
to have “some small advance in prices here and possibly some small decline
38 Strong to Federal Reserve Bank, New York, December 12, 1920 (not sent), File 1000.4,
Strong Papers; quotation from Strong to William Hailey, October 24, 1921, File 1111.2, ibid.;
Strong to Norman, June 27, July 5, November 1, 1921, File 1116.2, ibid.; Chandler, Ben-
jamin Strong, 174–177; Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, 234–35; Wueschner, Charting
Twentieth-Century Monetary Policy, 17–21; Friedman, “Real and Pseudo Gold Standards,” 67–68.
39 See Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, esp. 203–07; Chandler, Benjamin Strong, esp. 282–303;
Friedman, “Real and Pseudo Gold Standards,” 69–70.
40 Such policies were entirely compatible with central banking theories that, when gold was
valued at a ﬁxed price, short-term gold policy could be used to pursue other objectives, such as
maintaining stable interest rates or prices. See Marvin Goodfriend, “Central Banking Under the
Gold Standard,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 29 (1988), 85–124.        
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in their [British] prices. . . . The burden of this readjustment must fall more
largely upon us than upon them.”41
Yet, after making all such allowances, Strong undoubtedly had taboos he
would not contemplate breaking, of which countenancing excessive domes-
tic inﬂation was probably the most pronounced. His reaction to the British
economist John Maynard Keynes’s mere mention of American policies of “de-
monetizing gold and locking it up in Washington” was instructive. To Carl
Snyder, head of the New York Reserve Bank’s research division, Strong tetchily
complained that Keynes
must think we are indeed very stupid people. If we are going to permit this
gold, which does its initial damage the minute it arrives here, to do further
damage by permitting it to become the basis of a great inﬂation, he and
others of his stripe are consciously or unconsciously looking to this country
to indulge in a great inﬂation for their beneﬁt. We are not going to do it if it
can be helped and if they would be sensible enough to get their own houses
in order and manage their own damn currency in a sensible, civilized fashion,
they would shortly be able to come over here and get the gold they need to
present a respectable monetary face to the world. I am thoroughly tired and
impatient of the ravings of these inﬂationists who want us to play the part
of cat’s paw and pull their chestnuts out of the ﬁre when they haven’t the
courage to do it themselves.42
Not only Strong but many of his American and European compeers were famil-
iar with the economic writings of Keynes, notably A Tract on Monetary Reform
(1923) and the more polemical The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill
(1925), which suggested that their gold standard and monetary goals were
logically incompatible. Keynes speciﬁcally opposed sterling’s return to gold at
the $4.86 parity Norman favored and which, to Norman and many other British
ofﬁcials, was not negotiable. To them, this valuation was not merely an eco-
nomic goal but a matter of national honor, a symbolic reafﬁrmation of Britain’s
prestige and a public demonstration that the country had regained its pre-1914
international position. In the 1920s Keynes, by contrast, remained an economic
maverick whom ﬁnancial authorities, while admitting his brilliance, regarded
with considerable suspicion. His fondness for public controversy and invec-
tive, most evident in the publication of The Economic Consequences of the
Peace (1919) with its stinging attacks on Woodrow Wilson, led many British
and American bankers to consider him somewhat unstable, while the views
expressed therein led him to be labeled undesirably “pro-German” for some
years.43
41 Strong to Mellon, May 27, 1924, File Gold (Miscellaneous), 1922–1925, Box 86, Record
Group 56, National Archives II; cf. Chandler, Benjamin Strong, 283.
42 Strong to Carl Snyder, February 4, 1924, File 320.454, Strong Papers.
43 See Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes, Volume 2: The Economist as Saviour 1920–
1937 (London: Penguin Press, 1994), 189; Hession. This view of Keynes as pro-German pervades       
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When Norman sent him a copy of Keynes’s Tract on Monetary Reform,
Strong commented “that some of his conclusions are thoroughly unwarranted
and show a great lack of knowledge of American affairs and of the Federal
Reserve System.” Of Keynes himself, he wrote, “I have a great respect for his
ability and the freshness and versatility of his mind, but I am much afraid of
some of his more erratic ideas, which impressed me as being the product of
a vivid imagination without very much practical experience.”44 “Mr. Keynes
seems to have rather overdone himself,” Norman dismissively responded, “a
fact which perhaps comes from his trying to combine the position of ﬁnancial
mentor to this and other countries with that of a high-class speculator (by
which I mean one whose sole object is to buy stocks when they are cheap
and sell them when they are dear).”45 Other American bankers shared their
skepticism. “Keynes is always perverse, Puckish,” Lefﬁngwell wrote in 1931.
“He attacks anything sound or established or generally accepted, partly for
the fun of it, partly for the purpose of stimulating debate. In doing so he is
utterly irresponsible. He doesn’t care how much harm he does in giving aid
and comfort to the enemies of sound ﬁnance.”46 In rejecting Keynes’s views,
Strong, Norman, and their compeers simply reﬂected the conventional wisdom
of their day.47
Two factors help to account for Strong’s reluctance to take major risks to
facilitate Europe’s return to the gold standard. The ﬁrst was that, like most
international bankers of his time, he believed implicitly in the orthodox eco-
nomic principles of the gold standard, balanced budgets, and stable prices.
It is worth noting that Norman, who as a fellow central banker of similarly
orthodox economic views likewise detested inﬂation, found this perspective
entirely acceptable and apparently never suggested to his colleague that the
United States should tolerate greater inﬂation, accepting this state of affairs
as the price it must pay if European currencies were to return to gold.48 For
the correspondence for the early 1920s between the editors of Foreign Affairs, Archibald Cary
Coolidge and Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Archibald Cary Coolidge Files, Boxes 17–20, Hamilton
Fish Armstrong Papers, Mudd Manuscripts Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
44 Strong to Norman, January 4, 1924, File 1116.4, Strong Papers.
45 Norman to Strong, January 30, 1924, ibid.
46 Lefﬁngwell to Lamont, August 29, 1931, File 103-15, Lamont Papers. By 1945, however,
Lefﬁngwell had gained greater respect for Keynes, stating that he was “not popular over here, but
he knows his facts and his economics better than anyone else.” Lefﬁngwell to Lamont, September
13, 1945, File 104-5, ibid.
47 On the limitations of American economic thinking at this time, see also Chandler, Amer-
ica’s Greatest Depression, 111–14.
48 Despite his own opposition to Britain’s return to gold at pre-1914 parities, Keynes si-
multaneously expressed apprehension that the United States might jettison its existing policy of
accepting gold which it would “maintain . . . at a ﬁxed value” and instead “be overwhelmed by the
impetuosity of a cheap money campaign,” one which would lead the United States to release all
its gold simultaneously, with drastic effects on the international monetary system. John Maynard
Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform (London: Macmillan, 1923), 169, 175–76.      
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the majority of British and American international bankers and economists
in the 1920s, Strong included, their formative years had fallen in the prewar
period, when—as Eichengreen demonstrates—the self-regulating international
gold standard worked better than in any period before or since.49 They looked
back to that time as a norm whose restoration—including return to gold at
prewar parities—was the goal they sought to attain. In this sense they endorsed
the presidential campaign slogan of Warren G. Harding in 1920 for a “return to
normalcy.” It is also worth noting that the profound admiration American inter-
national ﬁnanciers felt for the British ﬁnancial system made it almost impossible
for them to appreciate how weak the British economic position was and how
detrimentally the First World War had affected Britain. Notwithstanding some
domestic British opposition, both Strong and Norman appear to have taken it
as a sine qua non that sterling must return to gold at the prewar parity.50
In Strong’s defense one should also note that even had he been prepared to
acquiesce in far greater U.S. price inﬂation than occurred in the 1920s, political
pressures might well have prevented him implementing such policies. Economic
policy is, like politics, the art of the possible. Memories of the inﬂation and
subsequent deﬂation of the 1917–1921 period helped to ensure that during the
1920s the maintenance of stable prices and the need to avoid either excessive
inﬂation or deﬂation became a major political concern and was viewed as a
primary objective of the Federal Reserve System. (Memories of these previous
monetary policies and their political and economic consequences may also
have been another reason why, in the late 1920s, the Federal Reserve System
hesitated to act decisively in either raising or reducing rates.) Despite Strong’s
oft expressed belief that central bankers should remain immune from political
pressures, in practice, as Wueschner has pointed out, he was highly sensitive to
political considerations.51 Although Strong doggedly resisted attempts to pass
legislation demanding that the Federal Reserve System employ rate policy and
open market operations to ensure price stability, preferring that Federal Reserve
ofﬁcials should be allowed to use their discretion in attaining this objective, it
was a goal he broadly shared.52 Publicly and in correspondence with Norman
he frequently stressed the importance of maintaining price stability.53 In this,
he reﬂected the views of most central bankers.
Even more broadly, internal political developments throughout Europe
jeopardized central bankers’ interwar efforts to return to gold. Eichengreen
49 See Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, ch. 1.
50 See, e.g., Strong to Norman, June 3, July 9, 1924, Norman to Strong, June 16, October
16, 1924, File 1116.4, Strong Papers.
51 See Wueschner, Charting Twentieth-Century Monetary Policy, xvi, 21, 36–37, 44–45, 50,
64.
52 Ibid., 54, 79, 119–20; Chandler, Benjamin Strong, 199–204; Hetzel, “Rules Versus Dis-
cretion Debate,” 7–11, 14.
53 See Kindleberger, Essays in History, 12.      
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plausibly argues that in the 1920s the commitment to defend the international
gold standard in difﬁcult times encountered new obstacles in many nations, not
just the United States, in the form of domestic policy objectives that interfered
with the honoring of the commitment. One major reason was that the post-World
War I broadening of the franchise in most European countries due to the spread
of universal suffrage had made it far more difﬁcult than before for governments
and central bankers to resist electoral pressures for increased social spending
and the reduction of interest rates, regardless of such policies’ impact upon
the international monetary system.54 French monetary policies appear to give
some conﬁrmation to this thesis. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the French
were far less committed than any other major European nation to maintaining
the international gold standard system. Although they ﬁnally returned to gold
in 1927, they did so—to the regret of Emile Moreau, the governor of the
Banque de France—below pre-1914 parities, which effectively subjected the
pound to additional deﬂationary pressures. (Revealingly, Strong showed little
interest in the precise par value of the franc.)55 For much of the Great De-
pression, French actions, including not only a gold sterilization but, ironically,
a tenacious attachment to gold several years after most other countries had
abandoned it, continued to compromise the international ﬁnancial system and
efforts to coordinate economic policies, just as French ﬁscal policies in the
early 1920s rejected the balanced budget norms which international ﬁnanciers
demanded. The effective secession of a leading European country from gold
standard norms made it commensurately more difﬁcult for others to continue
to observe them.56 Increasingly, countries pursued their own national economic
priorities even if the priorities conﬂicted with efforts to implement coordinated
transnational ﬁnancial cooperation.
54 See Eichengreen, Golden Fetters. Early in his career, the distinguished historian Paul M.
Kennedy likewise drew attention to the degree to which the extension of the franchise in early-
twentieth-century Britain vastly increased the political constituency for increased social welfare
spending, if necessary at the expense of defense budgets. Paul M. Kennedy, The Realities Behind
Diplomacy: Background Inﬂuences on British External Policy, 1865–1980 (London: George Allen
& Unwin, 1981) 47–51, 236–40.
55 Melvyn P. Lefﬂer, The Elusive Quest: America’s Pursuit of European Stability and French
Security, 1919–1933 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 166.
56 Ibid., chs. 4–8; H. Clark Johnson, Gold, France, and the Great Depression, 1919–1932
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, esp. chs. 8–10; Prefaces
by Milton Friedman, Stephen D. Stoller and Trevor Roberts, and Jacques Rueff to Moreau, Golden
Franc, x–xxi, 1–10; Charles P. Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe, 2nd ed. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), ch. 19; Friedman, “Real and Pseudo Gold Standards,” 70.
On French budgetary policies in the early 1920s, see also Stephen D. Schuker, The End of French
Predominance In Europe (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973).        
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4. CONCLUSION
Just before he died, Strong felt that the reconstruction of Europe was virtually
completed and his policies had been successful.57 Other leading bankers shared
this view. During World War II, his sometime critic Lefﬁngwell reﬂected, “As I
look back over the 1920’s it seems to me that the job we did in the reconstruc-
tion of currencies all over the world was a good one.” Expanding this theme,
18 months later he added:
[T]he British war debt settlement of 1922 or 1923 and gold resumption of
1925 . . . gave hope to the human race which did not altogether disappear
until in 1931 the Hawley-Smoot tariff, the veto of the German-Austrian cus-
toms union, the failure of Credit Anstalt, Hoover’s panicky defense of his
moratorium, and the May and Macmillan reports pulled the plug.58
Such optimistic views notwithstanding, between the wars Federal Reserve poli-
cies towards European recovery shared the prevailing weaknesses of broader
American internationalism, revealing the half-hearted nature of the post-1918
U.S. assumption of a greater world role. Charles P. Kindleberger suggests that
between the wars one of the major international economic structural problems
was the fact that, while Britain was no longer strong enough to play the role of
international economic hegemon, the United States was not prepared to assume
the associated burdens and responsibilities of the role it inherited.59 Warren I.
Cohen has described this period as one of “empire without tears,” when the
United States wished to enjoy the beneﬁts of international inﬂuence at the
lowest cost possible, refusing to bind itself to commitments overseas or make
the sacriﬁces almost inherent in a world hegemonic position.60 The diplomatic
historian Melvyn P. Lefﬂer has pointed out that post-World War I American
foreign policymakers were subjected to various conﬂicting and often inconsis-
tent demands, including among others domestic political pressures and calls
for ﬁscal economy at home, which decidedly limited the extent to which U.S.
ofﬁcials were prepared to make concessions to Europeans on such economic
issues as war debts, reparations, or trade and tariffs, as well as exchange rates.61
57 Strong to Owen D. Young, August 17, 1928, File 320.122, Strong Papers.
58 Lefﬁngwell to Lamont, April 4, 1940, File 103-22, Lamont Papers; Lefﬁngwell to
Lamont, October 10, 1941, File 106-11, ibid.; also Lefﬁngwell to Lamont, September 11,
1940, File 103-23, ibid.
59 See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1973), 25–29; idem., Essays in History, 45–46.
60 See Warren I. Cohen, Empire Without Tears: America’s Foreign Relations, 1921–1933
(New York: Knopf, 1987).
61 See Melvyn P. Lefﬂer, “Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism or Diplomatic Re-
alism? American Policy toward Western Europe 1921–1933,” Perspectives in American History 8
(1974), 428–30; idem., “The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy, 1921–1923: A Case Study in
the Applicability of the Open Door Interpretation,” Journal of American History 59:4 (December
1972), 585–601.      
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Numerous other historians, among them Frank Costigliola, Joan Hoff Wil-
son, and John Braeman, have drawn attention to the tentative, unsystematic,
and often contradictory character of American international thinking between
the wars, the profound hesitancy with which presidential administrations in the
1920s recognized any American responsibility whatever for managing the in-
ternational economic and political system, and the degree to which the United
States preferred to rely upon the unilateralist policies Wilson terms “inde-
pendent internationalism.”62 In this context, Strong’s determination neither to
abandon prewar European currency parities nor to demand economic sacri-
ﬁces of the United States in support of them epitomizes the halfhearted and
hesitant nature of his country’s overall interwar international outlook. The
Federal Reserve System’s own development trajectory closely paralleled the
broader pattern of the evolution of the United States as a world power. Mira
Wilkins rightly reminds us that between the wars the U.S. government de-
liberately eschewed formal involvement in European recovery and points out
“how new to world ﬁnance New York was” and how ill-equipped the inex-
perienced existing economic institutions were to handle the new international
ﬁnancial challenges.63 Viewed from this perspective, Strong’s efforts to facili-
tate European interwar economic recovery represented a remarkable departure,
especially when one recalls that the Federal Reserve System had only existed
since 1913. To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, their signiﬁcance was not merely
that they were ﬂawed, but that they were made at all. If Strong was no more
enlightened than his contemporaries, this was because he was a man of his
times. A product of the late Victorian era who fundamentally embraced that
period’s economic norms, he lacked, unlike the brilliant but often exasperating
Keynes, the visionary ability to construct a new paradigm of political economy.
Paradoxically, the very failure of Strong and his American and European
peers and their principles to provide lasting solutions to international economic
difﬁculties between the wars was high among the factors impelling American
ofﬁcials, when reconstructing the post-1945 world, to follow guidelines very
different from those followed in the 1930s. By the end of the Second World War,
the U.S. government was prepared to play the leading part in this enterprise;
moreover, European nations were then far more dependent economically upon
the United States than they had been in the 1920s, which greatly facilitated
62 See Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920–1933 (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1971); John Braeman, “Power and Diplomacy: The 1920s Re-
visited,” Review of Politics 44:3 (July 1982), 423–469; Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion:
American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1984).
63 See Mira Wilkins, “Cosmopolitan ﬁnance in the 1920s: New York’s emergence as an
international ﬁnancial centre,“ in The State, the Financial System, and Economic Modernization,
eds. Richard Sylla, Richard Tilly, and Gabriel Tortella (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 283; cf. Chandler, America’s Greatest Depression, 112–14.  
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American attempts to induce them to cooperate with American-led reconstruc-
tion efforts. At that time, the United States insisted upon ﬁxing exchange rates
at economically viable levels, and Treasury ofﬁcials were prepared to accept an
outﬂow of excess gold from the United States in payment for European exports.
More broadly, the impact of the Great Depression and the Second World War
impelled the United States to play the role of international political, not just
economic, hegemon, establishing a range of American-led institutions intended
to implement world recovery and stability, including the United Nations, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International
Monetary Fund. Moreover, when these proved insufﬁcient, the United States
quickly instituted supplementary measures, including the Marshall Plan, NATO,
individual loans to particular countries, and assorted military and economic
international aid programs.
Within the Federal Reserve System itself, Strong’s dominance of the Sys-
tem and the acrimony this often generated ultimately helped to bring reform.
An institution that could be so susceptible to domination by a single individual,
albeit one of great determination and ability, had inherent structural problems.
The general dissatisfaction non-East Coast bankers expressed over New York’s
predominance in the System might in any case have precipitated demands for
Federal Reserve reform. Yet it was above all the System’s failure to cope with
the crisis of the Great Depression that fueled the pressures leading to the 1935
Banking Act’s overhaul of the Federal Reserve System. The primary purpose
of the Federal Reserve System had been to prevent or at least alleviate the pan-
ics and depressions of the pre-1913 period. The operation of Murphy’s Law
ensured that, by the cruel workings of chance, Strong’s disappearance from the
System coincided with the period in which the System came under far greater
stress than ever before. Given the emphasis its founders had originally placed
on decentralizing power within the System, it may well be that the difﬁculties
of the 1920s and the Great Depression were experiences necessary to enable
the System’s reform.
In his memoirs, Herbert Hoover blamed Benjamin Strong’s international-
ism for the Depression. According to Hoover and other critics of Strong such
as Adolph Miller, the dominating governor of the Federal Reserve Board in
Washington, Strong’s “easy money” policies designed to assist Britain’s return
to the gold standard produced a speculative rise in stock prices on the New
York Stock Exchange. The inevitable bursting of that speculative bubble led
to the Great Depression. But this picture hardly ﬁts the Benjamin Strong who,
in his support of the fateful decision in 1928 to raise interest rates and force a
monetary contraction to bring down stock prices, was an economic nationalist.
High interest rates in the United States pulled capital out of Europe and forced
monetary deﬂation there and elsewhere. The international gold standard that
Strong had labored so hard to create became an engine of worldwide deﬂation.  
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The truth of the matter is that Strong, in his support of the rate hikes and
monetary contraction, was only adhering to the commonly accepted real-bills
views of his time. According to these views, central banks should thwart the
speculative extension of credit to prevent increases in asset prices that would
ultimately collapse and lead to deﬂation and depression. If Strong was guilty in
holding these views, then so too was the entire banking community, commercial
and central. The lesson is clear. Instead of looking for a single individual to
blame for causing the Great Depression, it is surely more enlightening and pro-
ductive to recognize the ﬂaws in the views underlying the policies that produced
that catastrophic episode. Such recognition is part of a broader understanding
of how America’s shift from isolationism to internationalism after World War
II promoted the more peaceful and prosperous world of the second half of the
twentieth century.